REFLECTIONS ON THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS
OF "THE SALE OF CORPORATE CONTROL"
WILLIAM N. SNELL*

The famous decision of Perlman v. Feldmann' aroused a continuing debate over the numerous questions prompted by the court's
treating the sale of control of a corporation as a transfer of a corpoxate asset or opportunity. 2 This article deals with the practical aspects
of representing clients involved in sales of corporate control. Two
areas of representation are considered in the analysis: litigation representation and representation of parties involved in or affected by
transactions transferring corporate control. Because the article centers on the practical aspects of the sale of corporate control, theoretical aspects of the subject are not covered.3 After a discussion of the
principles underlying the corporate control rationale, three representative cases are considered, with emphasis on the practical problems
confronting the lawyers participating in the transaction transferring
control and in the ensuing litigation. The remainder of the article is
devoted to a consideration of a number of practical problems which
may be involved in a sale of corporate control situation. One major
observation which is posited at various places in the article is that
from a practical point of view it is impossible for a controlling share* A.B. 1937, J.D. 1940, Stanford University; Member of the California Bar.
1. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), rev'g 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955).
2. See 219 F.2d at 175, 178.
3. Professor David C. Bayne of the University of Iowa Law School has written a series of
articles which analyze all aspects of the problem, with particular emphasis on the theoretical
rationalization of transfer of corporate control situations. For his analyses, see A Philosophy
of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963); The Sale of Corporate Control, 33
FORDHAm L. REv. 583 (1965); The Sale of Control Quandary, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 49 (1965);
The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 U. ST. Louis L.J. 445 (1965); Corporate Control as a
Strict Trustee, 53 GEo. L.J. 543 (1965); A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg
Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REv. 438 (1966); The Sale-of-Control Premium:
The Definition, 53 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1969); The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
Illegitimacy, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 215 (1969); The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 615 (1969).
Another article which should be cited more for its bibliography than for the conclusions
reached is Connolly, Perlman v. Feldmann and the Sale of Control-A BriefReconsideration,
26 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1971). Mr. Connolly seems far too optimistic in concluding that Perlman
v. Feldmann and the cases which have followed it have not radically changed what was once
thought to be the law. In addition, a recent case, Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048, 1051
n.6 (N.D. III. 1971), contains an extensive bibliography.
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holder either to exercise his control or to transfer it if he acts solely
in his capacity as a shareholder. Instead, the exercise of control and
the transfer thereof necessarily involve a controlling shareholder's
acting in non-shareholder, managerial capacities which entail duties
to the corporation and other shareholders-an aspect of control situations which the courts have tended to overlook or to which they have
paid inadequate attention.
FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE CONTROL

What is Control?

One might assume that control can be aptly defined as one of the
benefits which inhere in the ownership of a particular block of stock,
that it is in the nature of an individual property right, and therefore,
that it can be dealt with and disposed of as such. The various factual
situations presented by the case authorities and commentators soon
make it clear that such a simple definition is not valid.
The ownership of a majority of the issued and outstanding voting
stock of a corporation by a single shareholder is actually a rare factor
in the cases.4 Most of the cases involve combinations of shareholders,
sometimes related by blood or marriage,5 owning together a majority
of the voting stock. There are also situations involving practical control without legal control where the non-controlling stock is sufficiently widely held that less than the ownership of a majority of the
issued and outstanding stock provides practical control. However,
control is not limited to those individuals who own voting stock in a
corporation. Management, without any stock ownership, can be capable of controlling and transferring control to other management. 7
Also, ownership of the control of one corporation may from a practical point of view constitute the power to control the management of
another corporation." This situation is not limited to chains of parent
4. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969),
presents one of these infrequent situations. There, H.F. Ahmanson & Co., one of the defendants, owned 4,171 shares out of a total issued and outstanding stock of 6,568 shares.
5. See Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969),
where a husband and wife each owned 26.2% of the 1,000 issued and outstanding shares.
6. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant owning
28.3% of the outstanding stock of Republic Pictures Corp.); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955) (total stock held by the Feldmann family aggregating 33% of the outstanding
stock of the corporation involved).
7. See. e.g., McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899) (control of a mutual life
insurance company was so transferred).
8. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir. 1955).
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and subsidiary corporations but may result solely from contractual
arrangements whereby one corporation performs management functions for one or more other corporations
In a different context, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has endeavored to define control:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling", "controlled by" and
"under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a
person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise. 0

This rule 405 definition, which is significant in Commission practice
with respect to the contents of registration statements and prospectuses, limitations upon the transferability of securities, and the classification of persons as underwriters under the Securities Act of 1933,11
probably comes as close as possible to expressing the essential features of the control concept. Because the definition clearly recognizes
the fact that the ownership of voting securities is not necessary for
control, it embraces all of the fact situations referred to above. This
recognition is important, because it indicates that control, if exercised, is exercised not solely through rights vested in the shareholders
2
as such.'

How is Control Exercised?
Corporation law vests the management of corporations in a board
of directors. The board delegates the management functions to its
officers who in turn have the power to further delegate duties and
responsibilities. The legal rights of a shareholder, such as the right
to vote, the right of access to information, the right to dividends and
other distributions, and the right to sell and*transfer the shares
owned, are exactly the same whether the shareholder owns one share
9. Compare SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958) with Rosenfeld v.
Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), petitionfor cert. dismissed,.
U.S. .(1972).
These
cases involved the sale of control where control inhered in a management contract to manage
a mutual fund.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1972). Such a broad definition could make a controlling person
out of the president's wife, his mistress, or both.
IH. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
12. The failure to define control in the 1933 Act was intentional, and the rule 405 definition
followed Congressional intent that the term be given the broadest possible application. See
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934): "It was thought undesirable to attemptto define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the many
ways in which actual control may be exercised."
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or a controlling interest. From the point of view of these rights,
control does not inhere in any particular block of shares; it is derived
not from the ownership of the shares but from the exercise of the
voting rights of those shares at an annual or special shareholders'
meeting. Viewed practically, however, the exercise of day-to-day control involves an individual's acting in a non-shareholder, managerial
capacity or controlling the conduct of persons performing nonshareholder functions-that is, persons who are directors, officers,
managers, or employees of the corporation. If a corporation acts or
willfully refrains from acting, it does so through the agency of human
beings who owe obligations to the corporation and its shareholders
which are not derived from the ownership of stock.
How is Control Transferred?

The sale of control involves the transfer of the control of a going
business-a complex of assets, liabilities, contractual relations, and
internal and external economic conditions. Because control of a going
concern is to be transferred, usually the sellers and buyers both insist
on a form of transaction which (1) insures that they will not be
required to deliver the agreed-upon consideration until they are confident of receiving the consideration to be furnished by the other party
and (2) provides that the exchange of consideration will not have to
take place if, by virtue of changes in the going business, the transaction no longer complies with the original expectations of the parties.
Therefore, the typical contract of sale is quite detailed, containing
provisions reciting the premises of the agreement, basic terms of the
purchase and sale transaction, representations and warranties concerning the state of the business, and conditions precedent which are
intended to assure that any material adverse change will constitute
an excuse for withdrawing from the transaction and which are designed to prevent the seller from intentionally changing the condition
of the corporate business. 3 Only when such an agreement has been
signed can the parties make the preparations needed to close the
transaction, such as arranging financing, complying with local legal
requirements, verifying titles, and, occasionally, securing a certified
audit of the corporation's finances. Thus, the contract of sale will
necessarily provide that the closing take place at a specified future
13. Paradoxically, the contract in Perlman v. Feldmann was atypically simple. See note 25
infra and accompanying text.
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date after all of the above-mentioned arrangements have been accomplished.
The agreement may or may not set forth the mechanics for the
transfer of corporate control. Frequently, the contract of sale contains a provision that the seller will procure the resignations of the
members of the board of directors currently in office and will accomplish the election of directors nominated by the buyer. Regardless of
the terms of the agreement, a change in the board of directors and
management personnel almost invariably occurs and is accomplished
shortly before, at, or immediately after the closing. This change of
command constitutes the transfer of control that must be a part of a
transaction to make it a sale-of-control transaction.
How is Control Valued?

Valuation of control is a subject replete with problems, dilemmas,
misconceptions, and contradictions. 4 The issue is an important one
because, historically, judicial determination of the value of the stock
sold has played an important role in the development of the law
governing sales of control. The objective of a court in its valuation
of control is to determine if the "premium for control" in a particular
sale situation is a justifiable premium and therefore no wrongdoing
is involved. Analysis normally begins with the proposition that stock
is property freely salable by its owner, and that if stock carries with
it a unique quality-the power to control-it is worth more than
stock without this quality. Whether or not a justifiable premium was
paid in a particular situation is ascertained by a court's determining
the value of the stock sold and comparing that computed value with
the price obtained. If the computed value of the controlling block of
shares is less than the price received for the control stock, the illegality of the sale is established. However, if all the seller received was
the fair value of what he sold, then it is assumed that he was guilty
of no wrongdoing.
There are three basic methods used by experts to determine value:
(1) capitalization of income; (2) replacement cost; and (3) comparable
sales. Since income per share is the same for all stock of the same
class, the capitalization of income method could not justify a premium. Replacement cost necessarily involves stock carrying with it the
14. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 176 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir. 1955), where the trial court extensively discussed and evaluated the evidence in determining whether an unlawful premium had been paid for control.
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power to control; therefore, this method tends to merge with the
comparable sales approach. If one looks to other sales to determine
value, must not one also analyze each such sale to determine whether
the premium there involved was "justifiable," and if it was not, discard such sale as not "comparable" for the purpose of establishing a
"justifiable" premium? In deciding that another sale was comparable, the expert and the court will necessarily decide that what was
done there was legal, and to the extent that the same question is
present in the case before it, the court will have smuggled the conclusion into the premise.
It is extremely difficult to approach the problem of evaluating
control from the point of view of appraisal techniques, particularly
if the block of stock involved is not a majority block held by a single
shareholder. For example, take the situation of a corporation with ten
shareholders, each of whom owns ten percent of its stock. Any six of
these shareholders together hold a controlling interest in the corporation. Under the theory that a controlling interest may be valued at a
premium over a minority interest, the six who work together at any
moment have stock that is worth more per share than the stock held
by those shareholders with whom they will not work or who will not
work with them. The stock of the shareholder who falls out with the
control group loses value, and the stock of one who joins with the
control group gains value. What is valued, then, is not a property
right but rather the cooperative association of the parties involved,
since this association is the sole factor that contributes the excess
value. It may be noted that "conspiracy" would as aptly describe the
situation as "cooperative association."'I5
Moreover, as noted above,"6 practical control may not require the
concerted action of individuals holding a majority of the voting shares
of the corporation-where the company is widely held, considerably
less than 50 percent of the voting power is sufficient for control.
Such minority control is possible primarily because most of the
shareholders of widely held companies go along with the management
position as set forth in the annual proxy statements.
It is the power to solicit proxies for the annual meeting through
the control of the proxy solicitation machinery that perpetuates control." The corporation's proxy solicitation machinery is a corporate
15. See discussion notes 45-54 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.

17. For language supporting this proposition in a frame of reference where access to the
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asset operated at the corporation's expense by persons who are em-

ployed by the corporation. If the owners of the controlling block of
shares confine their activities solely to those things that can be done
in their capacity as shareholders, they will not be assured of perpetu-

ating their control and they will not be able to transfer it to the
purchaser of that block of stock. Because the management must act

in its corporate capacity to transfer control to the buyer of the shares,
one writer has referred to the premium not as the excess value attrib'
utable to the power to control, but rather as "the premium bribe."' 1
SALE OF CORPORATE CONTROL: CASE ANALYSES

Attention is given to three significant cases involving sale of control situations. Perlman v. Feldmann9 is analyzed first, because it

was the case that prompted an intensive study of the sale-of-control
area and created a number of questions which are still unsettled
today. Two recent cases, Jones v. H.F.Ahmanson & Co.20 and Brown
v. Halbert,21 which have established the law of California on the

subject of sale of control and have been influential in affecting the
law of other jurisdictions, are also treated.22 Factual analysis of these

three cases leads to the conclusion that in cases where a controlling
shareholder is held liable for the sale of control at a premium, his
condemned activities are usually not merely those of a shareholder
but include actions in positions where he has a responsibility to the
corporation and other shareholders.
Perlman v. Feldmann

Perlman v. Feldmann3 was a derivative action brought by minority shareholders of Newport Steel Corporation for an accounting
stockholders' meeting was not tied to equitable ownership of the corporation, see Rosenfeld v.
Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1343-49 (2d Cir. 1971).
18. See Bayne, Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, supra note 3, at 490.
19. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
20. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
21. 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
22. The present writer has subjective reasons for choosing these two cases for discussion,
both because the writer practices in California and because there has been made available to
the writer a considerable amount of factual information concerning the two cases which does
not appear in the published opinions.
23. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The most effective way to gain a true understanding of
Perlman is to study the voluminous findings of fact, the conclusions of law, and the opinion of
the trial court in conjunction with the appellate opinion and in conjunction with the related case
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
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and restitution of allegedly illegal gains accruing to the defendants
as a result of their sale of 37 percent of Newport common stock,
which constituted the controlling interest in the corporation. The
Korean War had made steel an item in short supply. The purchasers
of the controlling stock were a group of steel users, negotiating
through a newly formed corporation, who desired a sure supply of
steel and who, more particularly, desired to cojatrol the selection of
Newport's customers. The plaintiffs contended that a part of the
consideration paid for the stock included compensation for the sale
of a corporate asset-the ability to control the allocation of the corporate product in a time of short supply. The trial court held for the
defendants.2 4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and permitted the plaintiffs to recover in their own right, rather than
on behalf of the corporation, because the purchasers in the illegal
transfer as the new owners of the corporation should not be permitted
to share in any of the judgment. Several factors concerning the principal participants and their agreement which were either hastily mentioned or ignored in the opinion of the court of appeals indicate that
the defendants' breach in their managerial capacities of duties owed
to the corporation and its shareholders would have furnished a logical
ground for the decision.
C. Russell Feldmann was the principal defendant and was treated
as the controlling or dominant shareholder. In fact, however, he held
no shares of stock in his own name, and his control was derived from
his ownership of controlling interests in two other corporations which
held Newport stock and from Newport stock held by other members
of his family. Feldmann was the president of Newport, was presumably its chief executive officer (at a salary of $75,000 per year), and
also was chairman of the board of directors. During the negotiations
and prior to the execution of the written agreement, Feldmann gave
the prospective buyers complete access to all corporate business information which they desired. Additionally, he allowed a firm of
certified public accountants employed by the buyers to examine the
financial records of the corporation.
The contract for the condemned sale was in the form of an option
in the handwriting of William A. Alfs, who was counsel for both
Newport and Feldmann:
24. 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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William Mericka:
For and in consideration of $100, receipt of which is acknowledged, I agree
to sell to you 200,000 shares of Newport Steel Corporation for $4,000,000-at
any time on or before August 31, 1950.
If you exercise this option on or before Sept. 1, 1950,'on the terms above
set forth, I will give you at that time an option to buy an additional number
of shares of Newport Steel Corporation, not less than 175,000 shares nor more
than 200,000 shares at $20. per share, until 12:00 noon E.S.T. Nov. 1, 1950.
If you exercise the option to buy the shares (minimum 175,000, maximum
200,000) on or before Nov. 1, 1950, I will deliver to you, at the time you
exercise the option, the resignation of all of the members of the Board of
Directors of Newport Steel Corpn.
(Signed) C. Russell Feldmann '

The participants in the transaction informally agreed that if only
the first option were exercised, the buyers would be entitled to only
one seat on the board of directors. Both options were exercised on

August 31, 1950, and Feldmann delivered 398,927 shares of Newport
stock, receiving the stated purchase price. On that date, Feldmann's

controlled corporations and members of his family owned only
343,375 shares. Where the balance of the stock was obtained and why
Feldmann gave an option to purchase a number of shares substantially in excess of those that he owned or controlled is not explained.
There are references in the district court's opinion, however, to insi-

der trading by his friends and members of his family at prices of $11
to $12 per share to the extent of 3,000 shares in the over-the-counter

market and an indication that28the stock so purchased was delivered
at the closing for $20 a share.
Because Feldmann owned no stock personally and because he
stood in a fiduciary role as Newport's president and director, a conflict of interest stands out in bold relief. Moreover, Feldmann owed

a conflicting fiduciary duty not only to Newport but also to the two
corporations subject to his control which held Newport stock. Further fiduciary problems are evident in the fact that all Newport directors were shareholders, all joined in the sale, and all resigned at the

closing. And as noted previously, Feldmann's personal counsel was
general counsel to the corporation and was also a shareholder who
benefited from the sale.
25. Id. at 172.
26. Id. at 176. For the modern view of insider trading, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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What would have been the reaction of Feldmann, as Newport's
president, if his son-in-law, Joseph V. McKee, Jr., who was a shareholder and also a director, had without Feldmann's consent opened
the corporation's records, files, and properties to examination by the
proposed purchasers and had granted an option to purchase a controlling interest just as did Feldmann? Is it not apparent that Feldmann would have considered this an act of great disloyalty to him,
to Newport, and to the other shareholders? Similarly, when Feldmann and all of the other directors joined together to sell their personal stock, made complete information available to the buyers, and
ultimately resigned their positions as directors, they abdicated their
positions of responsibility. No one remained to guard the interests of
the corporation and the non-participating shareholders who, in fact,
owned more than 60 percent of the outstanding stock of Newport
Steel.
Instead of emphasizing the misuse of powers acquired by the
control group through accepting fiduciary positions in the management of the corporation, the Second Circuit seemed to condemn the
defendants' self-interested conduct primarily because of Newport's
advantageous position in the wartime steel market. In remanding to
the district court for a determination of "the value of defendants'
stock without the appurtenant control over the corporation's output
of steel," z the court implied that it would have been permissible for
the defendants to act as they did if they had not received a premium
price for their stock. If, in keeping with traditional corporation law
concept6, the court had focused on the defendants' misconduct in
their fiduciary roles, a more coherent decision reaching the essence
of the illegality would have resulted.
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,2 decided by the California Su-

preme Court in 1969, is a landmark decision in California corporation law. It has been referred to as establishing that majority shareholders, as such, owe a fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders. 9 Again, however, the question arises: Were the controlling
shareholders acting solely as shareholders or in positions which entailed responsibilities to the corporation and its other shareholders?
Jones arose when an owner of 25 shares of United Savings and Loan
27. 219 F.2d at 178.
28. I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
29. See. e.g., Connolly, supra note 3, at 1266.
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Association stock brought a class action against a Delaware holding
company owning 87 percent of United's stock and against the present or former holders of United stock who had transferred a controlling block of shares to the holding company. The plaintiffs in the
class action sought damages for breach of fiduciary responsibility.
The holding company had been formed to attract investor interest
in United Savings and Loan. The control group had transferred
their controlling interest in United to the holding company in exchange for its stock. A series of public offerings of the stock of the
holding company had been registered with the SEC and underwritten by a nation-wide group of underwriters, and the holding
company stock had been subsequently listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. The result was that the holders of the holding company
stock acquired a security that could be readily traded and whose
value was greatly enhanced by virtue of the public offering and the
public market, whereas the owners of the balance of the stock of
United, who had not participated in the exchange, had no market
for their securities and practically could dispose of them only to the
holding company or persons associated with it.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint without
leave to amend. The California Supreme Court, with one dissent,
reversed the decision. Justice Traynor, speaking for the majority,
found that the class action was not derivative and that there was no
necessity to show that the injury was unique to the plaintiff. The court
felt that a cause of action resulted from the breach of fiduciary duty
which the majority shareholders owed to the minority shareholders.
On the subject of damages, the court held that since the minority
shareholders should have been offered an opportunity to participate
in the exchange resulting in the formation of the holding company,
damages for the breach were not to be limited to the results of an
appraisal of the value of the shares of the minority shareholders.
Rather, as the court stated, "[s]ince the damage is real, although the
amount is speculative, equity demands that the minority stockholders
be placed in a position at least as favorable as that the majority
created for themselves." 30 This language indicates some departure
from the proposition that a controlling interest is entitled to command a premium price in the market, although it could also be interpreted as a judicial resolution of all doubts against the fiduciary who
has failed to measure up to his responsibilities.
30. i Cal. 3d at 117-18, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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The court's articulation of its basis for the decision leaves something to be desired. For example, the proposition that a holder of a
majority of the stock of a corporation owes a per se fiduciary duty
to the minority and must refrain from conduct that would adversely
affect the value of the stock owned by the minority is difficult to
support when applied to practical realities. Consider the situation
where the owner of 51 percent of the stock of a corporation is presented with an opportunity to sell for two, three, four, or ten times
more than it would appear the stock is worth, the offer being contingent on the sale of 100 percent of the outstanding stock. Under the
fiduciary doctrine of Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., must the con-

trolling shareholder sell his stock in order that the minority shareholders can take advantage of this exceptional opportunity? It seems
apparent that a court would be faced here with a constitutional limitation upon the enforcement of this alleged fiduciary obligation. The
owner of any share of stock, including the owner of 51 percent or
more, must be free to say "no" to any offer regardless of how ridiculous his decision might appear to someone else. Otherwise, he is being
deprived of one of the principal rights of ownership-the right to
continue to own.
It is submitted that it was not necessary to go as far as the
Ahmanson court chose to go in finding a fiduciary obligation stemming from ownership of a controlling interest. As previously noted,
there is no concept in statutory corporation law that differentiates
between the ownership of one percent, 51 percent, or 99 percent of
the stock insofar as the rights, powers, and duties of a shareholder
are concerned . 3 Except in unusual circumstances, the owner of a
single share of stock has the same shareholder rights as the owner of
a majority interest. Furthermore, the rights of a shareholder to receive corporate information and to inspect the books, records, and
physical properties of the corporation are not absolute and are considerably more limited than the rights of officers and directors.32
When the foregoing propositions are considered, a question arises
as to whether the majority shareholders in Ahmanson were acting
simply as shareholders or whether they were using powers vested in
them as directors and officers to secure a personal profit. Some
assistance may be obtained through an examination of what is required when a corporation enters into an underwriting agreement,
31. See pp. 1195-96 supra.

32. See I F.

O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS

§ 3.63 (2d ed. 1971).
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files a registration statement with the SEC, and disseminates a prospectus-the process followed by the Ahmanson control group in
promoting the public sale of the holding company's stock. The
registrant's legal obligation is to make full disclosure-that is, to
set forth in the prospectus all facts that a potential investor would
reasonably desire to know in making an investment decision, and,

in addition, "all facts necessary to make the facts stated not misleading. ' 33 This obligation has been interpreted to require the
registrant to provide full information with respect to all subsidiaries
which the registrant controls.34
In view of the limited rights to information vested in shareholders,
how could the controlling group in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.
have supplied the requisite detailed information about the holding

company's subsidiary, United, except by following one of two
possible courses: (1) using powers vested in the members of the

group as directors or officers and not as shareholders or (2) con-

spiring with an individual who held the office of officer or director? 35

The defendants asserted in A hmanson that, in the use of their own
shares, they owed no fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders of
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1970).
34. SEC regulations require that certain information describing the business be contained
in the prospectus. See Form S-2, Information Required In Prospectus, Items 9(a) ("Briefly.
describe the business done and intended to be done by the registrant and its subsidiaries"),
9(b)(1) ("If the registrant and its subsidiaries are engaged in more than one line of business
. . ."), 12 ("Briefly describe any pending legal proceedings other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business to which the registrants or any of its subsidiariesis a party.")
(emphasis added), reprinted in I CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
7145 (1972).
Complete financial statements are also required to be filed with the SEC and included in
the prospectus, particularly where, as in the Ahmanson case, the subsidiary constitutes the
principal valuable asset of the holding company.
A section entitled "Undertakings," appearing at the end of the instructions concerning the
making of the registration statement, additionally provides:
The following undertaking shall be included in every registration statement:
Subject to the terms and conditions of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the undersigned registrant hereby undertakes to file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission such supplementary and periodic information, documents, and
reports as may be prescribed by any rule or regulation of the Commission heretofore or
hereafter duly adopted pursuant to authority conferred in that section. Form S-2, Undertakings To File Reports, reprintedin I CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
7145 (1972).
By such reports, the registrant must provide the SEC with prompt notice of any development or event taking place which would be significant to an investor in determining whether
or not to buy or sell the stock of the registrant, and must include in such a description events
affecting subsidiaries.
35. For a discussion of conspiracy as a possible cause of action in sale of control situations,
see notes 45-54 infra and accompanying text.
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United. This argument proves too much, for it admits that all of the
actions which were required to be taken by the control group as
directors and officers in advancement of the plan to create a public
market for the United stock through the holding company device
were taken not for the benefit of United or its shareholders but for
the sole benefit of one particular group of shareholders. In light of
this, could not the case have been decided on the simple basis that
the defendants' activity represented a breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of those directors of United who were also stockholders of the
holding company as well as a conspiracy to breach that fiduciary duty
on the part of those stockholders of the holding company who were
not directors of United?
Brown v. Halbert
Brown v. Halbert6 was a class action involving a sale of a controlling block of stock in a California savings and loan association.
Halbert and his wife each owned 265 of the outstanding 1000 shares
of the Tulare Guarantee Savings and Loan Association. Halbert was
president of the Association and was on the five-man board of
directors, while his wife served as assistant secretary-treasurer.
Two other shareholders joined with the Halberts in the saleMorris, a director of the Association and owner of 23 shares, and
Tienken, who owned 20 shares.
Four minority shareholders, three of whom were the remaining
members of the Association's board of directors, brought a class
action setting forth two causes of action alleging that Halbert as
president and director owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation which
he breached in order to facilitate the sale of his personally-owned
stock at a profit. The first cause of action sought the imposition of a
constructive trust upon the profits of the sale for the benefit of the
minority shareholders of the Association. The second cause of action
contained an additional allegation that the breach of fiduciary duties
depreciated the value of the stock owned by the plaintiffs and other
minority shareholders and sought damages on this basis." The trial
court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the
California First District Court of Appeal reversed on the first cause
of action, holding that Halbert had indeed possessed a fiduciary obli36. 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
37. The second cause of action constituted a cause of action at law and thereby qualified
the case for a jury trial.
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gation which he had breached by the sale, and that he should have
acted affirmatively and openly to insure that the minority shareholders had substantially the same advantages enjoyed by the majority.3 8
The case was remanded solely for the purpose of determining, allocating and distributing the trust fund under the constructive trust
cause of action. The appellate court appears to have ruled that the
trust fund was to be computed by determining the average price per
share for all shares sold by both the minority and majority shareholders and then deducting this amount per share from the sales price
actually received by the majority shareholders; the trust fund remaining was to be distributed to minority shareholders in such a manner
that all shareholders who sold would receive the same price per share.
Minority shareholders who did not sell would not participate in this
3
trust fund. 1
Two important elements of the practical problems confronted in
control cases are presented by this case: (1) the aspect of valuation
and related evidence and (2) the terms of the contract by which the
defendants disposed of their stock.
The majority shareholders sold their stock for $1,548.05 per share,
2I/2 times book value; book value was approximately $600.00 per
share. Immediately after the sale, the purchasers offered the minority
book value. The two experts who
shareholders $300 per share,
testified both recognized that control could be sold for a "justifiable"
premium. The defendants' expert testified that control should sell for
2 1/2 times book value and that the minority interest should sell for
book value. The plaintiffs' expert testified that control should sell for
10 percent above an average value per share and that minority stock
would logically sell for 10 percent below the average value per share.
A value for the entire corporate business was first determined and
was divided by the number of shares outstanding to arrive at the
average value per share. The defendants' expert made no attempt to
validate the $300 per share offered the minority by the control purchasers.
In Brown, the problems of valuation of the premium for control
are apparent. First, how can one reconcile the sale at $1,548.05 per
share by a defendant who owned 20 shares with the sale at a price of
$600.00 per share by one of the plaintiffs who owned 19 shares? Sec38. Id. at 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
39. The case was settled after the appellate court decision, so there are no further proceedings to clarify the unresolved issues.
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ond, recognizing that a franchise to operate a savings and loan association is granted by the state and is in itself a valuable asset with no
book value, how can one justify the valuation of one share of stock
to include no portion of this intangible value, whereas other shares
of the same stock are valued at 2 /2 times book value? Finally, Brown
demonstrates the principle that a justifiable premium for control is
directly related to what the owners of control can legally do vis-i-vis
the minority shareholders.
In Brown, the defendants' expert testified that the value of the
minority interest plus the value of the controlling interest equalled the
value of 100 percent of the corporation. On this basis, he gave as his
valuation of the corporation the sum of $1,167,000. If, therefore, the
purchasers had been successful in their plan to buy all of the minority
stock at $300 per share, their total cost would have been $1,028,000.
A bargain purchase indeed would have been secured. If the courts
allow the owners of the controlling block of stock to elect themselves
to the board of directors and then to use their vested powers as
directors to oppress the minority shareholders and pressure them into
selling their stock cheaply, then one may be sure that the value of the
control block will be greatly enhanced and that the premium will
increase to the extent that the courts allow such coercive conduct by
the control group.
A second practical problem of control presented by Brown appears in the contractual aspects of the sale. The total consideration
for the controlling block was approximately $887,000. Because no
sophisticated purchaser is likely to obligate himself for such a large
amount of money without having a strong legal position from which
to close the transaction, the purchaser will require a boiler-plated
written contract to insure that he receives precisely the anticipated
consideration. Brown involved such a contract which followed the
standard pattern used in corporate transactions of this nature. The
agreement included a representation of the total number of shares
outstanding, a statement of the agreement to sell a certain number
of shares at a certain price, a recital of representations, an agreement
to close the transaction through escrow, and a section devoted to
representations, warranties, and agreements. The warranties required
that at the close of the sale the sellers would resign as officers and
directors and arrange for new elections; that prior to the closing the
Association would neither declare dividends nor make any unusual
payments of compensations not in keeping with past business practice; that the Association would not have in existence on the closing
date certain types of contracts which could not be cancelled within
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60 days; that the Association on the closing date would have neither

issued nor arranged to have issued any stock other than that outstanding on the date of the agreement." All of the shareholders who

participated in the sale at the premium price bound themselves to
these warranties. How could Halbert have carried out these provi-

sions strictly in his capacity as a shareholder? Or, to phrase the
inquiry another way, how could Halbert have functioned as a director

acting for the benefit of the corporation and all of its shareholders
after he had made this agreement?
It is hornbook law that a fiduciary may not undertake obligations
which interfere or conflict with the performance of his fiduciary duties.4" Suppose, for example, on the day after the agreement was

signed, someone had walked into the offices of the Association and
offered $2,000,000 for its assets or presented an offer of merger with

the same beneficial price for all shareholders. Would Halbert as a
director and as the president have been capable of functioning as a

trusted spokesman for the Association and all of its shareholders?
When a director, by means of an agreement made for his personal
benefit, limits his freedom of action in his capacity as a director, it
appears that he has immediately breached his fiduciary obligation to
40. The warranties provided:
I. That upon close of this escrow [the sellers] will submit such resignations as
officers and directors of the Association as may be requested by the buyer, and will hold
such directors' and/or stockholders' meetings as may be requested by the buyer for the
purpose of electing new officers and directors of said Association.
2. That prior to the close of escrow herein the Association will not declare any
dividend to the stockholders or make any payments or compensations which are not in
keeping with the past business operations of the Association, and that the Association
will be operated in accordance with normal and customary procedures and policies of
the Association and of the savings and loan business.
3. That the Association will not have at the date of close of escrow any contracts
or plans of the following classes outstanding which cannot be cancelled by the Association without liability to it within sixty days: Employment contracts, contracts with
escrow agencies, contracts respecting the right to handle any existing or future insurance
of the Association or its borrowers, insurance agency contracts, contracts with loan
solicitors, or other contracts materially adverse to the Association, or any retirement,
profit-sharing, deferred compensation, bonus or pension plans other than such as are
approved in writing by buyer. . ..
7. That as of the close of escrow the Association shall not have issued or agreed to
issue any shares of guaranty capital stock other than the 1,000 shares now outstanding.
Agreement (Jan. 14, 1963), recorded in Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 60, Brown
v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Alexander v. Theleman, 69 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1934).
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the corporation, and it is immaterial that the events never occurred
that would have resulted in easily provable damage both to the corporation and to the other shareholders. In this situation, it cannot be
said that there is no damage to the corporation and to its shareholders, and, although at this stage in a sale of control transaction the
damage is not compensable because the amount and nature of monetary damage cannot be legally established, a court might justifiably
grant equitable relief rather than denying relief altogether.
Another contractual provision of interest in Brown provided as
follows:
[To confirm the representations made by sellers concerning the status of
the business] buyer shall have the right to approve the financial conditions of
loans and general business condition precedent to the consummation of this
sale. If the warranties made by sellers to buyers are not borne out by buyers'
examination of the Association, this agreement shall be null and void, and the
42
$20,000.00 deposit will be returned to buyer.

In order to execute this provision, Halbert was required to disclose
to the buyers a significant amount of information concerning the
Association, which he had acquired not by virtue of being a shareholder but rather through his position as a director and an officer of
the Association. Additionally, without the consent of the board of
directors, Halbert agreed to give access to all of the corporate records
to a party who was not legally entitled thereto. 43 Due to these agreements, the buyers sent in a team of investigators who spent several
days going over all of the records and properties of the Association.
Under these facts, it seems totally unnecessary to find a fiduciary
duty on the part of the controlling shareholder in order to establish
his misconduct. Individuals whose behavior resembles Halbert's
should be liable because they have misused their positions as directors
or officers. Moreover, those shareholders who, in selling their stock,
go along with the directors and officers should be held liable because
they have accepted the benefits of the condemned activities. 4
42. Agreement (Jan. 14, 1963), recorded in Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 60, Brown
v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
43. Query: Would the directors' giving their consent to the buyers to examine the records
for the purpose of permitting the controlling shareholders to sell their stock have validated the

situation? Would this action have been just another breach of fiduciary obligation by the other
directors?
44. One portion of the evidence in Brown v. Halbert dramatically illustrates the difficulty
with the proposition that control can be given a premium price as a matter of valuation and
that the minority should be willing to accept this result. After the closing, a directors meeting

was held (apparently for the purpose of reorganizing the board), and the attorney for the buyers

Vol. 1972:1193]

SALE OF CONTROL

SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF "SALE-OF-CONTROL"

1211
LITIGATION

Although it might seem more logical to deal with the practical
aspects of representing sellers, buyers or other individuals interested
in control transactions before considering the problems involved in
sale-of-control litigation, it should be noted that one primary objective in the representation of participants in a sale-of-control
transaction is to protect them from the risk of litigation in the future.
To accomplish this objective, the attorney must have in mind the
factual and legal issues that are likely to be presented and the

strategies that might be adopted in litigation resulting from a sale
of control. This proposition indicates that a consideration of the role
of the plaintiff's lawyer is extremely important.

In litigating an allegedly illegal sale of control, the plaintiff should
always include a cause of action founded on conspiracy. 5 When
shareholders, none of whom alone holds a controlling interest, band
together in a cooperative association to control the company, not for
the purpose of directing its management in an effort to enhance the
company's profitability and safety, but rather with a view towards
made the following statement:
I think it might be a good idea to clear the atmosphere around here, Mr. Halbert
But what I wanted to say was that we were willing to pay the premium for the control
of the Association, only not for 100% of the shares. That is a lot of money. Gentlemen,
you are trying to make us spend another three or four million dollars and we are not
going to do it .

. .

. Now, we are happy to have any minority stockholders go along

with us for the ride if they understand clearly, it would be our idea, I know I am
expressing your opinion, that is one reason we'd prefer not to have any more dividends
on the Guarantee stock because we'd like to draw it in, increase the assets of the
Association . . . . I like this business, if you do sell, then you'll get a capital gain, [if
not] you will be going along with us for a ride. We are not going to try to force you
out. On the other hand, if you want to sell out at this time, we just aren't interested as
businessmen in paying fifteen hundred dollars a share for minority stock. If you want
to get out and don't want to go along, I think a figure at three hundred dollars isn't
something to sneer at .

. .

. Minutes, Post-Closing Director's Meeting, recorded in

Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 596, Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76
Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
To this, Mr. Brown (a director and one of the minority shareholders) later responded:
I am not trying to compare my head with his legal mind, but if we ride along with
you as minority shareholders and go through these years of growth and you build the
assets up to the place where it is attractive to somebody else and you sell, we are still in
the same position we are now. We are minority stockholders and our stock conceivably
wouldn't be worth any more than it is now. In fact, it doesn't look to me like it's worth
anything now except what people . . . (at this point Mr. Brown became inaudible). Id.
45. See Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc., 11970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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maximizing their opportunity to sell their personally owned stock at
a profit, it is apparent that the cooperative association has become a
conspiracy formed to misuse fiduciary powers for personal gain. Such
an association necessarily involves the band of shareholders' acting
in capacities which entail fiduciary duties to the other shareholders
or in their exerting control over persons who are in such fiduciary
capacities.
A conspiracy is commonly defined as a combination between two
or more persons to do something that is unlawful or to do something
that is lawful in itself in an unlawful manner." It is a civil tort.,' Thus,
a legal cause of action can be posited in any sale-of-control case
where the plaintiff's rights are violated by virtue of concerted action
among the seller, the buyer, the members of the board of directors
and, perhaps, the lawyers representing them.4
What are the advantages to be gained from including at least one
cause of action founded upon an alleged conspiracy in a sale-ofcontrol situation? Since conspiracy constitutes a legal cause of action,
the right to trial by jury is assured. This tactic becomes important in
light of the fact that the judge is required to take a position as to the
law prior to the jury's decision. Because of the complexity of the law
in this area, and because of the probability that large sums of money
will be involved, an appeal is extremely likely. The jury instructions
given will tend to shed considerably more light on the judge's opinion
concerning the applicable law than will the findings of fact and conclusions of law in a non-jury case which are usually prepared in great
measure by the prevailing parties' counsel after the judge has reached
his decision."
A further advantage of a conspiracy cause of action is the standard of proof required to establish the existence of a conspiracy in a
46. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § I.

47. Id. § 43. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed.
1971).
48. There is no principle of law that exempts a lawyer from liability if he knowingly engages
in an unlawful conspiracy, even though he does so in his capacity as a lawyer representing one
or more of the parties. See Celano v. Frederick, 54 III. App. 2d 393, 203 N.E.2d 774 (1964).
49. In Brown v. Halbert, the court stated:

At the outset, it must be noted that the verdict of the jury was only advisory on the
equitable issues. We note that 114 instructions were given to the jury, to some of which
we will hereafter refer . . . . Their significance lies chiefly in that they reflect the

reasoning by which the Trial Court concluded there was no liability on the first cause
of action. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 254, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
Then the court proceeded to direct several pages of discussion to the issues raised by the jury
instructions. Id. at 259-69, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 785-92.
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sale-of-control situation. The plaintiff need not prove an actual agreement among the conspirators; instead a conspiracy may be inferred
from the course of dealing between the participants. 0 The standard
of proof is illustrated in the following representative jury instruction:
Plaintiff, in order to prove the existence of a conspiracy need not show you
an express formal agreement between the conspirators. You may infer the
existence of a conspiracy from a course of dealing or through an exchange of
words or from the acts done. An unlawful conspiracy may be and often is
formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. Plaintiffs are seldom capable by direct testimony or evidence to prove a
conspiracy. Therefore, the law allows you as members of the jury to infer the
existence of a conspiracy from things actually done, taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct of the parties who are
charged with the conspiracy. 51

The conspiracy cause of action should also include an allegation
that the defendants have been guilty of oppression, fraud and malice,
and a prayer on account of this conduct for exemplary or punitive
damages should be considered. 52 Even in situations where it is uncertain that sufficient evidence of fraud, oppression or malice can be
produced to secure an award of punitive damages, the allegation is a
sensible tactic because the scope of the admissible pretrial discovery
and proof at the trial may be broadened to include each defendant's
ability to pay, a relevant element in the determination of the amount
3
of punitive damages.1
Inclusion of a conspiracy cause of action has the additional advantage of broadening the class of persons liable to the plaintiffs,
should they succeed. Any participant in an unlawful conspiracy is
equally liable with his co-conspirators whether or not any benefit
flowed to him from the conspiracy.54 Furthermore, as soon as the
plaintiff has proved that a particular defendant was a member of the
conspiracy, then all of the acts and declarations of the other coconspirators are chargeable against that defendant.
Advantages are also to be gained by pleading a federal cause of
action. The most likely federal cause of action to be pleaded is a
50. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Perry, 102 F.2d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 1939); Fink v. Sheridan Bank,
259 F. Supp. 899, 902-03 (W.D. Okla. 1966).
51. See generally 3 REID's BRANSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 467 (1970).
52. See Walton v. Anderson, 6 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 85 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
53. See Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
54. See J.C. Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal. App. 2d 363, 16 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961).
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violation of rule lOb-5 55 promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.56 Also available in certain circumstances may be a cause of action under the antitrust laws.57 The advantages of a federal cause of action are evident: defendants otherwise
not subject to service of process, or upon whom service in state courts
may be secured only with great expense and difficulty, are easily
reached. Furthermore, the rules of pleading and the discovery procedures in federal actions are frequently more liberal than those under
state law. Fortunately, access to the federal courts is not secured at
the expense of foregoing causes of action under state law, for under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, it is often possible to join state
causes of action with the federal cause of action, thereby having all
causes tried within the same forum. 8 This procedure could result in
the federal court's deciding that the federal cause of action was not
well founded but at the same time finding for the plaintiff on one or
more of the state causes of action.
Sale-of-control cases frequently present the plaintiff with an opportunity to bring a class action.59 Several considerations should be
carefully weighed before deciding to proceed in this manner. It should
be realized that the plaintiff(s) undertaking to act as class representative will bear sole liability for all of the defendant's taxable costs in
the event plaintiff loses. Furthermore, at some point in the proceeding, members of the class must be given notice and the corresponding opportunity to join in the action or to elect not to be bound by
the results of the action.6" The plaintiff must bear the costs of
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).

56. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972). There
appears to be a drift away from the rule that l0b-5 actions must involve a buyer or seller of
shares. A transaction involving the sale of securities other than those representing equity of
the controlled corporation may be sufficient to provide jurisdiction. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1972).
57. See generally Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Where, as in Perlman v. Feldmann, the
purpose or effect of the sale is to foreclose others from being able to purchase the corporation's
product, it would seem that an antitrust conspiracy cause of action could be stated.
Of course, diversity of citizenship might provide the necessary federal jurisdiction. See
Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Boggess v. Hogan, 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. III. 1971); Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc,, 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. III. 1970). See also Marshall v. Spang & Co., 321 F. Supp. 1310
(W.D. Pa. 1971).
59. For example, Ahmanson and Brown both involved class actions.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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giving notice, which can be very substantial. Finally, once a class
action is commenced, it may not be dismissed or settled without court
approval.6
While the propriety of the plaintiff's lawyer's contacting others
similarly situated has been questioned as potentially involving a violation of professional ethics, 62 in any event it is advisable that the lawyer
(I) inform his client of the potential liability for costs and (2) urge
his client to contact other persons similarly situated, asking them to
join as parties-plaintiff and thereby share this liability for cost.
Analysis of sale-of-control litigation up to this point has emphasized the role of the plaintiffs lawyer. What can the defendant's
lawyer do to protect his client? The foremost defense to litigation is
the avoidance of exposure. 3 However, if litigation has commenced,
the following considerations should not be overlooked. If the defendant's lawyer has previously acted as counsel for the company as well
as for the selling shareholders, he may find himself greatly embarrassed in the conduct of the defense. Under these circumstances,
defense counsel is well advised to locate a substitute counsel who has
no previous connection with the corporation. The attorney-client
privilege between a corporation and its counsel is a rather dangerous
area. It is submitted that the privilege should lie between the management and counsel and not between the corporation as such and counsel, so that only the management could waive the privilege and compel the giving of testimony. There are theoretical and practical reasons for this opinion. From the theoretical point of view, it would
seem that the justification for the existence of the privilege is that it
facilitates complete and truthful communication between attorney
and client, thereby resulting in the transmission of reliable legal advice. Under this analysis, if the minority shareholders can on behalf
of the corporation cause a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the
purpose of the privilege is frustrated and the lawyer would be well
advised to inform his client in advance that he might be forced to
testify with respect to any questions presented to him concerning the
relationship of the corporation to its minority shareholders. From a
practical standpoint, it is suggested that when the corporation's management changes, its lawyer changes as well. It is difficult under such
circumstances for counsel to develop a feeling of loyalty to the corpo61. See id.; J.

MOORE,

3B

FEDERAL PRACTICE

23.80 (2d ed. 1969).

62. S. WECHSLER, PROSECUTING & DEFENDING STOCKHOLDER SUITS (P.L.I. 1972).
63. For discussion of representation in sale-of-control transactions, see pp. 1216-17 infra.
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ration. The very phenomenon creates a conflict of interest insofar as
the attorney's state of mind is concerned. Unfortunately, however,
the courts have not viewed the corporate attorney-client privilege in
this fashion. Management should recognize that the minority shareholders may be able to force a waiver of the privilege in sale-ofcontrol cases of this nature. 4
Litigation might develop in such a pattern that at some point the
defense lawyer is faced with a motion on the part of the plaintiffs to
be allowed to amend their complaint in order to name the lawyer as
party defendant on the ground that he knowingly participated in a
conspiracy intended to violate the rights of the plaintiffs. While securing independent outside counsel at the inception will not necessarily
avoid this possibility nor make the situation more comfortable for the
lawyer involved, it will certainly lessen the lawyer's personal embarrassment and damage to the client's cause.
SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF REPRESENTING THE SELLER OR THE
BUYER IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE TRANSACTION

At the outset of a sale-of-control transaction, the lawyer should
thoroughly explain to his client (whether seller or buyer) that, if the
transaction becomes the subject of litigation, the expected benefits
will be materially diminished whether or not the litigation is successfully defended. Prompt recognition and anticipation of this problem
is essential so that a conscious decision can be made early in the
negotiating stage as to the advisability of assuming whatever risks of
litigation appear to be involved. In evaluating these risks, counsel
should not overlook the fact that the burden of proof may be upon
the defendants under the general rule that those occupying fiduciary
positions must defend their acts when challenged by the cestuis que
trust.65
The dominant or controlling shareholder possesses advantages
emanating from his position of strength alone and thereby has the
power to determine to a considerable extent the form that the transaction will take. He can guide the negotiations toward the type of
transaction which is most desirable for him, whether it be a sale of
64. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314.(7th Cir. 1963); Garner
v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).

65. Brown v. Halbert exemplifies this general rule. See 271 Cal. App. 2d at 252, 76 Cal.
Rptr. at 781.
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assets, merger, tender offer, or consolidation. If the transaction cannot be negotiated on satisfactory terms, he need not proceed with it.
The dominant or controlling shareholder must not ignore the
effect upon other shareholders of the disposition of control of the
corporation and should be advised to consider this effect at all stages
of the transaction. He should communicate as fully as possible with
minority shareholders, endeavoring to extend to them the same opportunity to dispose of their stock that he possesses. By all means he
should avoid any affirmative action excluding the minority from participation in the transaction. If the controlling or dominant shareholder is unwilling to forego a premium for his stock, these precautionary measures will make it more likely that existing problems will
be disclosed before the transaction becomes binding or is closed,
while a decision to withdraw from the transaction to avoid the problems is possible. They also may provide an opportunity for the buyer
to set up defenses based on waiver, consent or estoppel, with respect
to all or some of the minority shareholders. Insofar as possible, a
written record should be maintained concerning the measures, as
witnesses rarely agree as to the content of verbal communications.
The buyer's counsel should be aware of the risk of litigation,
particularly with regard to the possibility that the buyer (and perhaps
buyer's counsel) will be named as a co-conspirator. In a legitimate
sale, it should make no difference to the buyer whether the desired
percentage of stock is supplied by the controlling shareholder or
proportionately by all of the shareholders. If forced to deal with the
control group alone, the buyer can secure some protection through
the use of appropriate representations, warranties and indemnities,
and through a provision that a portion of the consideration will be
held in escrow as a security deposit for the period of the statute of
limitations. This escrow provides a fund for the payment of any
damages resulting from breaches of warranties or representations.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to provide ideas and suggestions of
practical benefit in the representation of clients both in transactional
and litigational situations which involve the sale of corporate control.
Because of the diversity of situations covered, any attempt at summation must necessarily be of a general nature. With this thought in
mind, one final suggestion is offered concerning the attitude a lawyer
should adopt when dealing with problems of control and problems of
business representation generally. The trend of the sale-of-control
cases is away from mechanistic reasoning that liability will be im-
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posed only in exceptional cases; instead, recent decisions have tended
to impose fiduciary obligations on the selling shareholders, placing
upon them the burden of proof to justify the fairness of the transaction to the minority shareholders. Despite the fact that this approach
may be overinclusive, this trend has its counterpart in many other
areas of business litigation. Therefore, the lawyer must recognize that
where profit is the motive66 and where the strong are in a position to
injure the weak and concurrently have the power to avoid or minimize
injury but fail to do so, then the courts will find a theory upon which
liability can be imposed. So, in representing the strong, the safe
course is to comply with the highest standards of business ethics, and
in representing the weak, it is advisable to provide the court with
numerous theories on which it can base a determination of liability.
66. In Perlman v. Feldmann, the defendants, after paying the judgment, still retained over
$6.000,000. In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., the value of the defendants' stock, had the
minority shareholders been given the same opportunity to sell, would still have been in excess
of $50,000,000. In Brown v. Halbert, the defendants still retained over $700,000 after paying
the minority shareholders.

